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Abstract. The optimal market structure is one of the fundamental issues of economic theory. At that, companies’ efficiency in the market is 
associated with resource availability as a whole and finance resources, in particular. The structure of the banking market in terms of 
commercial loans determines a number of parameters of the economic system, such as its stability, growth potential, entrepreneurial 
activity, the state of commodity markets, the competitiveness of companies, etc. A comparative analysis of countries in terms of the ratio of 
commercial loans to GDP allows us to identify promising markets and strategic avenues for the development of the global banking industry 
and investment policy. However, a lack of regular and timely statistical reviews often impedes the identification. With the view to 
performing a comparative analysis for the EA/ЕU macroregion, the authors attempt to establish the types of the banking market in Russia 
based on a fuzzy rank approach using the probability theory. Using the data for 2009–2018, the authors assess bank concentration in Russia 
by a number of indicators. During the period under review, the volume of commercial banking lending in Russia experienced a steady 
increase. At the same time, there is a clear downward trend in the number of banks; several local “breakdowns” happen once every two 
years, i.e. the compression rate is reducing. Within the framework of the accepted gradation, the values of concentration indices taken 
separately do not allow arriving at a firm conclusion, since they indicate contradictory statuses of the sectoral market type. The integrated 
approach proposed in the paper helped find that, despite a relatively large number of participants in the Russian banking market, it should 
be primarily identified with a monopoly. At that, the values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and standard concentration fall 
within the oligopoly boundaries. This indicates the fuzzy nature of the sectoral market. The empirical results obtained are of use when 
analyzing competition, developing antimonopoly regulation measures, adjusting the banking sector development strategy and investment 
policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Banking systems of many countries are currently being transformed. Despite individual differences, there is a 
clear trend towards a decrease in the number of banks and an increase in concentration of banking assets (Berger, 
2003; Pawlowska, 2017; Basten and Sánchez, 2018; Pak and Iwata, 2018). Qualitative structural shifts in the 
financial sector can boost a long-term potential of economic growth and its sustainability. Empirical studies, with 
some exceptions, prove that. A more developed sector of financial intermediation is able to transform savings into 
investments more effectively, redistribute risks between economic agents and ensure a rapid exchange of 
economic data (Mamonov et al., 2017). 
 
As with any industry market, the banking market needs to maintain competition and prevent monopolism. The 
condition is due to the necessity to improve the sustainability of the institutional system and protect market 
  
 
 
participants and stakeholders. In practice, the parameters of the normal level of competition for a particular 
banking sector are difficult to establish because of a number of factors, the primary of which is that the results of 
the assessment of the banking competition level can differ significantly depending on the approach applied. When 
examining market competitiveness, the analysis of the concentration level is of special importance. The 
concentration of market participants shows the relative size and the number of companies in the industry. Based 
on the data on the share of banks in different market segments, it is possible to evaluate the intensity and 
heterogeneity of competition. 
 
In terms of volumes, one of the most powerful segments is the market for bank loans, i.e. loans to enterprises and 
organizations. The ratio of bank loans to GDP is a key factor in the economic development. At the same time, the 
heterogeneous distribution of commercial loans may affect the national economy sustainability and its exposure to 
business risks. A comparative analysis of countries by the indicator allows us to identify promising markets and 
strategic avenues for the banking industry development. However, a lack of regular and timely statistical reviews 
often impedes the identification. For example, empirical and poorly structured statistical data serve as the basis 
for analytical research of the banking market in Russia. This makes it difficult to compare Russia and other 
countries. In order to resolve this problem, we establish the types of the banking market in Russia based on a 
fuzzy rank approach using the probability theory. 
 
It is worth noting that the increment rate of loans in Russia outruns the increment rate of GDP; however, Russia 
demonstrates one of the lowest rates of this indicator among large developed and developing countries. The ratio 
of bank loans to GDP in Russia falls within 60–70%. For comparison: the same ratio in Europe is over 150%; 
China – over 190%; the USA – over 230%; Brazil – over 100% and India – over 75% (Legacy Square Capital, 
2017). Such a spread in figures indicates that, when it comes to financing production, the credit potential of 
Russian banks is underused. At the same time, long-term lending is hindered by the low capitalization of banks 
with a scarcity of internal reserves for its growth, the short-term nature of their resources, which cannot be 
transformed into investments due to the lack of an effective refinancing and funding system (Mukhametshina, 
2014). 
 
According to Mamonov et al. (2017), Russia is able to enhance domestic credit to private sector from 60% of 
GDP to the optimal 95–100% of GDP. Since Russia is rather far from the optimal level, the expansion will be safe 
in terms of risks to macroeconomic stability (of course, if it is not of an explosive character). The growing credit 
availability in the domestic market will smooth the dynamics of commodity output (reduce GDP volatility by 1.3 
percentage points) and cause a somewhat increase in long-term GDP growth rates (by 0.3 percentage points). For 
this reason, the market for bank loans to non-financial organizations and the public in Russia is the subject of the 
most acute competition (Krylova, 2009a). As a result, there is obvious concentration in the Russian banking sector 
and the role of large banks is increasing. Risk-tolerance is a related issue here, since the elevated competitiveness 
of banks encourages opportunistic behavior (Marinč, 2013). We will look at these and other trends in details later 
in the present paper when evaluating concentration and establishing the type of an industry market for the Russian 
banking sector. 
 
Theoretical and empirical studies demonstrate that the competitive structure of the banking market has both 
positive and negative effects. In the literature review, we summarized some of the identified patterns while 
arguing the importance of concentration and centralization of bank capital as a factor influencing the most 
important economic processes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Let us look at the views of economists on the nature of the processes of concentration and centralization of bank 
capital. According to Schlossberg (2004), concentration of bank capital is localization of the main mass of 
banking operations in a small number of large banks. Vishnever (2006) argues that the term “concentration” 
  
 
 
should be viewed as a process of enhancing a bank’s capital by capitalizing the share of value added. 
Centralization is an increase in capital preceded by consolidation of a number of smaller pieces into the large one 
(Krylova, 2009b). 
 
There is a number of clear trends observed in the banking industry. 
 
First, accumulation of bank capital is determined by the patterns of the expanded reproduction of all social capital 
under the specific historical conditions (Krylova, 2009a). The accumulation is ensured through a wide and more 
efficient use of the domestic funding sources (Medvedev, 2015). 
 
Second, the problem of increasing concentration of bank assets is among the most urgent topics for scientific 
research conducted with a direct participation or assistance of central banks all over the world. The scrupulous 
attention of monetary authorities to this process is due to its possible positive and negative consequences for the 
monetary system and the entire national economy. The effects of increasing concentration in the banking industry 
(Berger, Demselz and Strahan, 1999), which sometimes have contradictory reasons, are the following: a drop in 
personal income and an adverse effect on the production volume (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Shaffer, 1998; 
Collender and Shaffer, 2000); a fall in the business/entrepreneurial activity when it comes to starting new 
companies (Black and Strahan, 2000; Bonaccorsi and Dell’Ariccia, 2000; Kuzmin, 2018); a growing range and 
availability of banking services (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; DeYoung, Hunter and Udell, 2004); a rise in the 
financial leverage of companies, additional protection of creditors’ rights, but at the same time inadequate 
protection of property rights (González and González, 2008; Teresienė,  2018). 
 
 
); increased consumer confidence (Idzik, 2017); the development of special forms of credit relations  (Neuberger, 
Pedergnana and Räthke-Döppner, 2008); no strong need for measuring and regulating market power (Peláez and 
Peláez, 2009); strategic delay in entering the market (VanHoose, 2017); a destructive effect on credit availability 
for companies with financial constraints (Shikimi, 2013); etc. 
 
Law and Singh (2014) point out that, if the state holds the largest portion of the bank capital, it increases interest 
rates, especially on mortgage, which lowers the standard of living of the population. Simoguk (2013) refutes this 
viewpoint by stating that monopolization in the banking sector guarantees interest rates to be stable and produces 
a positive trend in increasing interest rates on deposits, which leads to an increase in welfare. 
 
Coricelli and Marc (2010), Cetorelli (2004) and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) concentrate on examining the 
contradictions of theoretical modeling and empirical assessment of markets. They find that countries or regions 
with a more concentrated banking sector usually have more concentrated commodity markets. These findings 
emphasize the negative influence of banking concentration on economy and consequently on companies’ 
performance and industrial development. 
 
Hoxh (2013) looks at how the strengthening of banking competition and concentration affects the volatility of 
manufacturing sectors: banking concentration restrains the volatility of industries’ growth, but as banking 
competition increases, so does the volatility of industries’ growth. Pagano (1993) sticks to the same position and 
provides evidence of the adverse effect of the banking market’s concentration on economic growth. 
 
According to Svirydzenka and Yousef (2015), if banking concentration grows, it reduces economic sustainability, 
which, in turn, adversely affects not only the preservation of the growth potential, but also the ability to enter 
foreign markets (through the production of competitive goods/works/services). At the empirical level, industries 
that are more dependent on external financing grow faster than industry on average in countries with a high 
concentration in the banking market (Moiseev, 2008). 
 
  
 
 
Mishkin (1992) comes up with similar ideas and associates banking concentration with the scale and scope of 
possible financial crises. Within the framework of the traditional theory of industrial organization, Moiseev 
(2008) suggests that large banks have a depressing effect on economy, and oligopoly (but not monopoly or perfect 
competition) is the structure of the banking market, which maximizes economic development. 
 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006) hold opposite opinions. They suppose that current banking 
concentration leads to stability and consistency, which strengthens a country making it more attractive to foreign 
partners. At the same time, Hellman and DaRin (2002) propose a theory and empirical data demonstrating that 
more concentrated banking sectors encourage the development of new sectors and, thus, serve as catalysts for 
industrialization. 
 
To explain these contradictions, it is noteworthy that the conditions for financial stability formed in developed 
countries are not always identical to those formed in transitional economies and can exert the opposite effect. In 
some cases, the consolidation of banks was a response to risk, uncertainty and increased competition; banking 
institutions, therefore, were forced to use the most cost-saving strategic tools to cut their costs and boost revenues 
(Ayadi, 2008). 
 
Ely and Robinson (2005) believe that these processes are due to (1) the accelerated increase in the business scope 
and larger banks’ capital mass driven by profit accumulation (direct concentration), and (2) acquisition of small 
banks by larger ones and creation of banking groups and concerns of banks (centralization). These processes are 
intertwined: mergers of banks usually stimulate an accelerated increase in their capital and income, and the rapid 
growth in the scale of economic operations allows restraining and dominating over competitors. 
 
The literature review shows that over the last years competitiveness of national bank services markets has been 
analyzed using the Panzar-Rosse approach instead of concentration indicators (Bikker and Haaf, 2001; Coccorese, 
2009; Anzoátegui, Martínez Pería and Melecky, 2010). Along with the method, the Bresnahan model (Rezitis, 
2010) and the Barrush-Modeshtu model (Drobyshevsky and Paschenko, 2006) were also applied. The models for 
measuring the degree of competition rely on the approaches of the new empirical theory of industry markets. They 
are based on the competition behavior of banks under the conditions where there are no ways to influence the 
outcome by utilizing the structural features of the market. 
 
Quantitative concentration indicators, such as the concentration ratio, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the 
entropy index, the indices of Linda, Gini and Hall-Tideman, dispersion of market share distribution, the 
coefficient of variation, etc., are also traditionally used. According to Aliev (2017), the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI) is the most optimal to evaluate concentration in the banking industry. The authors will try to 
neutralize the inconsistency of these methodological approaches through analyzing their assessment capabilities, 
limitations and applicability to the case under consideration. 
 
3. Materials and Methods 
 
As specified above, the structure of industry market is primarily characterized by its level of concentration. A 
number of studies (Shtapova, 2009; Ezrokh, 2013; Bikker, 2004; Edwards and Patrick, 2012; Blanco, 2011) 
support this view. At the same time, other distinguishing features of a market should be taken into account. The 
structure is also characterized by the three basic features: the number of suppliers (N), their market share (S) and 
concentration indices. It allows establishing the type of market under the conditionally permanent dynamics 
(Table 1). We propose considering several features underlying the conceptual understanding of the type of 
industry market. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 1. Distinguishing features of the main types of industry markets 
 
Market type Supply structure Products/services Barriers 
Competition A high number of suppliers with low quotas Standardized Low 
Monopolistic competition An average number of suppliers with medium quotas Diversified Low 
Oligopoly A low number of suppliers with high quotas Standardized/diversified Significant 
Monopoly Sole supplier Exclusive High 
Source: (Avdasheva and Rozanova, 1998). 
 
Kuzmin, Volkova and Fomina (2019) deal with the methods of the linear range approach. 
 
The distribution of market shares is illustrated using the example of the cumulative Lorenz curve (Lorenz, 1905). 
The concentration ratio (CR) is calculated as the sum of the market share percentage held by the largest specified 
number of firms (n<N) in an industry. The ratio indicates the proportions of the shares of the largest players and 
the shares of the smallest suppliers. This may cause inconsistencies when comparing different market spheres, 
which will not allow conducting research with the help of the method of known addition (Avdasheva and 
Rozanova, 1998). However, it is possible to calculate additional indicators applying the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index, as well as the coefficients of market share dispersion, conditional concentration, etc. 
 
Market share dispersion 2  demonstrates a degree of discrepancy in the distribution of all market players’ shares. 
The higher the dispersion value, the higher the market concentration. The major disadvantage of the approach is 
that it does not take into account the number of players (Avdasheva and Rozanova, 1998). In contrast, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is the optimal way to resolve the dispersion problem due to the quadratic 
formula (Hirschman, 1964): 
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If under perfect competition HHI is assumed to tend to zero, then if the index is 1, it is absolute monopoly. As a 
side note, the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation (FAS Russia order…, 2010) in its 
calculations uses predominantly CR3 and HHI. The remaining indicators are supplementary. FAS Russia 
distinguishes between three levels of market concentration: high (CR3 > 0,70, HHI > 0,20); moderate (CR3 > 0,45, 
HHI >0,10), and low (CR3 <0,45, HHI < 0,10). 
 
The relative concentration ratio CRRn is calculated as a ratio of the aggregated share n of the largest firms AnS  to 
the share of their revenue AnQ  (Besanko, 2009). The maximum share index ISmax compares the market leader’s 
share maxS  with the average share aS . Thus, under perfect competition, the index is 0, and under full monopoly, it 
is 1. Despite its simplicity, the index allows for both the measure of inequality and the number of players. 
However, there is a nuance here: the index does not take into account the ratio of outsiders (Cowell, 2011). 
 
The Gini coefficient is related to the Lorenz curve and used to assess the inequality of the size of firms along with 
market share dispersion. The Hall-Tideman/Rosenbluth index is commonly used to calculate distribution of 
market players by shares. Under perfect competition, its value tends to 1 and falls (Hall and Tideman, 1967), if 
market concentration increases. 
 
The Linda’s index is aimed at comparing firms in the situation, where in the market there are more than one leader 
n>1, and assessing their inequality. The index is a ratio between the market share of each supplier i with the 
market share of all market leaders from the 1st to the n-th (Linda, 1976): 
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The value of the Linda’s index is non-monotonic in relation to n. If the value of n increases from n=2, the value of 
indL  decreases. The number of market leaders is the value of n, after which indL  begins growing. 
 
The inverse share value index invI  (in percent) compares the sum of suppliers’ inverse share values with the 
N2/100 index: if 0.75< Imax ≤ 1, it is perfect competition; if 0.5< Imax ≤ 0.75, it is monopolistic competition; if 
0.25< Imax ≤ 0.5, it is oligopoly (Cowell, 2011). 
 
The perfect entropy ratio ER determines the average share of the firm and shows the entropy of shares distribution 
(Shannon, 1948). The higher ER, the lower market concentration and market power of each player. This ratio is 
used to compare the previous index between the markets. The closer ER to 0, the greater market concentration 
(Clarke, Davies and Waterson, 1984): 
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All these indices can be categorized into two groups: concentration indices (CRn, CRR, HHI, HT) and share 
inequality indices (ER, Gini, Lind, ISmax, Iinv, 2 ). Each index has its own advantages and disadvantages by certain 
metrics (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Advantages and disadvantages of concentration indices 
 
Parameter 
Index/coefficient 
CRn CRR HHI HT ER Gini Lind ISmax invI  2  
Consistency (determines the development of 
outsiders)   + + +    + + 
Efficiency (determines the variability S)   + + + +    + 
Intuitivity (determines N and inequality) + +     + + +  
Behavior (determines the variability N and merger)     +  +   + 
Source:generalized by the authors. 
 
Thus, there emerges the need for scaling the values of indices to level the disproportion of estimates. We have 
generalized the approaches to calculating coefficients and indices by producing a gradation of criteria indicating 
one of the three types of market: monopoly, oligopoly and monopolistic competition (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. The matrix of criteria and boundaries of their values of indicators to determine the type of industry market 
 
Index/coefficient 
Aggregated type of market/criteria’s boundaries 
Monopoly Oligopoly Monopolistic competition 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Concentration ratio CR3 70% 100% 45% 70% 0% 45% 
Relative concentration ratio  CRR3 0 0.5 0.5 1 1 + 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index НHI 1800 10000 1000 1800 0 1000 
Dispersion of market share distribution 0.75 1.00 0.25 0.75 
- 0.25 
The Gini index 0.75 1.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.25 
The Hall-Tideman index HT 0.75 1.00 0.25 0.75 
- 0.25 
Relative entropy ER 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 1.00 
The maximum share index 0.75 + 0.50 0.75 - 0.50 
The Linda’s index  0 3 3 15 15 + 
The inverse share value index 
- 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 + 
Source: generalized by the authors. 
  
 
 
In the present study, to resolve this task, the authors propose a method based on the probability theory. Using its 
provisions, the quantitative probability is established by the fact how close the current level of the indicator is to 
its boundary, which changes dynamically. Thus, even at the same or approximately the same values of the current 
level, probability may differ significantly depending on the dynamics of the boundary (threshold) level of the 
coefficient or index. 
 
We believe that the search for the cumulative characteristic of the type of industry market should be carried out 
based on the Laplace distribution function (Kotz, Kozubowski, and Podgórski, 2001) and quadratic mean. The 
type of market will be determined as one of those presented, for which the calculated root mean square probability 
by the Laplace function is the highest. The mathematical representation of calculating probability by Laplace 
(Bening and Korolyov, 2008) takes into account such parameters as the lower and upper boundary of the 
acceptable range of fluctuations of the indicator values, the value of mean and standard deviation: 
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where ( )iR a f BL   is probability within the range of the initial threshold value a  and the boundary level BL; 
( )L z  is the Laplace function; a  is the initial threshold value; ( )if CP  is the indicator’s average value for the 
period under consideration; ( )iCP  is the indicator’s standard deviation for the period under consideration. 
 
The research limitations of the approach reside in a number of provisions. The boundary level is a subjective 
characteristic and can vary. The quality and accuracy of the probability estimates are also affected by the 
completeness of the data collection. In the situations, where the period under consideration is short, the statistics 
of the current level of industry concentration coefficients and indices will be incomplete, and the correctness of 
the estimates of the market type is low. 
 
4. Results 
 
To analyze concentration of the banking sector in Russia and establish the type of industry market, we should 
look at actual market data for the decade from 2009 to 2018 (Fig. 1). The main source data for the calculation are 
the market volume defined as a sum of commercial loans issued to enterprises and organizations by Russian banks 
during the reporting period. 
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Fig. 1. The volume of commercial banking lending market in Russia 
 
Source: the data of the Central Bank of Russia. 
 
The volume of commercial banking lending market in Russia experienced a steady growth throughout almost the 
whole period. A temporary decline in 2017 did not break the general trend and, as a result, it can be ignored. For 
the purpose of our study, the dynamics of the market volume is considered monotone positive. At the same time, 
the number of market participants is characterized by the dynamics opposite to that of the market volume. The 
number of players demonstrates a clear downward trend with several local “breakdowns” happening once every 
two years, i.e. the compression rate is reducing. The Russian banking system consists of a relatively large number 
of participants: there were 462 of them in 2018. The market is dominated by several large partly state-owned 
banks that hold about half of all banking assets (Anisimova and Vernikov, 2011; Chernikova and Zaernyuk, 
2011), which is confirmed by official statistics. [Rezbaev (2013) hypothesizes that high concentration of assets in 
Russia during 2013–2015 was due to the lack of a clear concept for managing the federal treasury’s liquidity, 
which resulted in the need to involve commercial banks in handling accounts of budgets of various levels and, 
primarily, the federal budget.] This process occurs firstly due to the fact that large banks increase their assets at a 
faster rate than small and medium-sized banks. This is a special feature of the Russian case of consolidation in 
comparison with consolidation of banking assets in developed countries. It is important to bear in mind that 
Russian banks are frequently interconnected through cross-ownership of shares or a single owner. This 
circumstance somewhat distorts the real picture of competition in the market. 
 
Let us analyze concentration of the banking sector in Russia using industry indicators. The results of the 
calculations are supplied in Appendix A. 
 
There was a constant upward trend in the concentration ratio during almost the entire period. This can be traced 
equally, and, therefore, is true for the values of the concentration ratios CR3, CR4, CR6 and CR8. Throughout the 
period under consideration, the values of CR3 fall within the range that corresponds to the boundaries of 
oligopoly (see Table 3). At that, there is observed a monotone approximation to the upper boundary of 
oligopoly/lower boundary of monopoly. In other words, if the dynamic persists, the market is expected to become 
monopolistic. Moreover, during the last two years of the period under discussion, this trend is present in CR8. 
Nevertheless, the concentration ratio of 2009–2018 indicates that the sector is oligopolistic. Now let us compare 
this conclusion with the data provided by other indicators. The relative concentration ratio displays inverse 
  
 
 
dynamics with respect to the concentration ratio. The values of the relative concentration ratio are in the range 
that corresponds to the boundaries of monopoly, while the general dynamics indicates its strengthening. 
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is directly related to the concentration ratio. HHI shows a steady growth. The 
values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index are in the range of oligopoly boundaries. At that, the general dynamics 
of the period allows asserting that, if the trend persists, in the near future the lower boundary of monopoly (level 
1800) will be forced. If the Herfindahl-Hirschman index indicates a certain type of industry market which 
contradicts the conclusions on other indicators, then the final decision on the type of market is made taking into 
account additional data. 
 
According to the data obtained, the variance of market shares of participants in the Russian banking market 
increases along with the increase in the concentration ratio. For the purpose of the current analysis, the dynamics 
of the market share dispersion is considered monotone positive. Thought the entire period under discussion, the 
values of the market share dispersion exceed 1, which indicates a monopoly market. 
 
The inverse share value index demonstrates multidirectional, extremely unstable (near-sinusoidal) dynamics, 
which does not correlate with the dynamics of any of the indicators described above, including the concentration 
ratio. However, throughout the entire period of 2009–2018, the values of the index vary within the range of a 
monopoly type of market. 
 
The dynamics of the coefficient of variation completely follows the dynamics of the concentration ratio. It grew 
during almost the whole period (excluding 2010 and 2016). 
 
The values of the Gini Index during the period under review are within the range of the monopoly boundaries. At 
that, the general dynamics allows asserting that, if the trend continues, the movement will occur away from the 
lower limit of monopoly. 
 
The maximum share index shows inverse dynamics in relation to the concentration ratio. The values of the index 
correspond to the monopoly boundaries. The index is expected to change towards the strengthening of monopoly, 
although in absolute terms, this change is insignificant and the values fluctuate around 0.99. 
 
A different type of market is determined by the Hall-Tideman index. As the concentration ratio increases, so does 
the index, its dynamics is monotone positive. The index’s level corresponds to monopolistic competition. The 
general dynamics makes it possible to claim that, if the emerging trend persists, the movement will occur towards 
the lower boundary of oligopoly. It is noteworthy that monopolistic competition here is in conflict with the type of 
market determined by the majority of other indicators. 
 
The Linda’s index is characterized by multidirectional, unstable dynamics in relation to the dynamics of the 
concentration ratio. It rose at the beginning of the period and declined at the end of the period. The Linda’s index 
at the beginning of 2009–2013 was over 15 (>15), which corresponded to monopolistic competition; in 2014–
2018, is did not exceed 15, which indicated the oligopolistic type of market. 
 
Thus, we can see that determining the type of industry market with the help of individual characterizing indicators 
leads to ambiguous and sometimes contradictory results. To arrive at the conclusion about the aggregated type of 
an industry market, we apply the probability approach and integration based on the root mean square. The 
calculated data are given in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Probability distribution of the main indicators of an industry market’s concentration  
for the banking sector of commercial lending in Russia for 2009–2018 
 
  
 
 
Index/coefficient Monopoly Oligopoly Monopolistic competition 
Concentration ratio CR3 0.00 96.92 3.08 
Relative concentration ratio CRR3 99.99 0.01 0.00 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index НHI 0.04 99.79 0.17 
Dispersion of market share distribution 0.00 0.00 100.00 
The Gini index 100.00 0.00 0.00 
The Hall-Tideman index HT 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Relative entropy ER 0.00 100.00 0.00 
The maximum share index 100.00 0.00 0.00 
The Linda’s index 4.22 39.08 56.70 
The inverse share value index 99.34 0.66 0.00 
Root mean squre 63.15 55.57 48.19 
Source: calculated by the authors. 
 
As shown in Table 4, the maximum root mean square indicates a monopolistic type of market. Within the 
framework of the present analysis, this result will be considered aggregated and final. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index can be applied to perform a comparative regional analysis of the concentration 
level of homogenous markets. Look at the state of the banking industry in Russia and the EA/ЕU macroregion in 
2009–2017 (Fig. 2; Appendix B). The EA/ЕU macroregion is a number of states included in the European Union 
and/or using euro as the official currency. 
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Fig. 2. The concentration level in the banking industry of the EA/EU and Russia in 2017 by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
 
Source: the data of the Eurostat, calculated by the authors. 
 
As the data obtained show, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the banking industry in Russia falls within the 
boundaries of oligopoly. Fig. 2 illustrates that the banking sectors of only a few countries in the EA/EU region 
can be classified as monopolistic, namely Finland, Estonia, the Netherlands, Lithuania, and from the second half 
of the period under review – Malta and Cyprus. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index classifies the majority of the 
EA/EU banking sectors as monopolistic competition. These are primarily Germany, Luxemburg and Austria, 
where the concentration level of the banking sector in minimal. 
  
 
 
 
While describing the dynamics of the banking sectors’ development, it is worth noting that the countries with the 
maximum monopoly (Finland and Estonia) are characterized by a downward trend in the concentration level and 
in the future are likely to enter the zone of oligopoly, if the planned trends continue. The opposite situation is 
typical to the banking sector in Russia that demonstrates a virtually monotone growth in the concentration level. 
Although it remains in the oligopoly zone, if the planned trends persist, in the near future it can be considered 
completely monopolistic. 
  
Conclusions 
 
Economic stability emerges under the influence a complex set of factors and conditions that among other things 
include the sectoral concentration of banks. From the perspective of volumes, a powerful segment is the market 
of bank loans (loans to enterprises and organizations). The ratio of bank loans to a country’s GDP is a key factor 
in the economic development. As with any sectoral market, the banking service market needs to maintain 
competition and prevent monopolism. Traditionally, concentration is assessed according to quantitative 
indicators, such as the concentration ratio, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the entropy index, the indices of 
Linda, Gini and Hall-Tideman, dispersion of market share distribution, the coefficient of variation, etc. 
 
To generalize about the calculated indices, we used an integrated calculation based on the Laplace distribution 
function. The method allowed us to calculate the probability value of attributing the Russian banking sector to a 
particular type of industry market. We found that, despite a relatively large number of participants in the banking 
market in Russia, it should be more closely identified with a monopoly. At the same time, the values of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the standard concentration and some other indices are within the boundaries of 
oligopoly. This indicates that the nature of the sectoral market is fuzzy. 
 
While comparing Russia with the EA/EU nations, we arrived at the following conclusions. Firstly, according to 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the banking sectors of the majority of the EA/EU states are identified with 
monopolistic competition (Germany, Luxemburg, Austria, etc.). Secondly, the EA/EU countries with 
monopolistic banking sectors (Finland, Estonia, etc.) demonstrate a downward trend in the concentration level 
and in the future are likely to enter the zone of oligopoly, if the planned trends continue. Thirdly, the banking 
sector in Russia demonstrates a virtually monotone growth in the concentration level. Although it remains within 
the oligopoly zone, if the planned trends persist, in the near future it will be considered completely monopolistic. 
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Appendix А 
 
Table А1. Sectoral coefficients and indices of the Russian commercial banking lending for the period of 2008–2018 
 
Indicator 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Concentration ratio CR3 50.6% 46.9% 47.9% 50.3% 51.5% 52.6% 54.6% 55.9% 58.6% 60.9% 
Concentration ratio CR4 54.7% 51.5% 52.5% 54.6% 55.9% 56.9% 60.7% 62.1% 63.3% 65.6% 
Concentration ratio CR6 60.7% 58.2% 59.1% 60.8% 63.0% 64.0% 68.8% 69.9% 71.7% 73.9% 
Concentration ratio CR8 64.5% 62.2% 62.9% 64.4% 66.7% 68.1% 73.6% 74.7% 76.9% 78.7% 
Relative concentration ratio CRR3 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.36 
Relative concentration ratio CRR4 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.34 
Relative concentration ratio CRR6 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32 
Relative concentration ratio CRR8 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.32 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index НHI 1337.5 1182.4 1186.1 1310.6 1309.2 1389.6 1461.9 1434.2 1533.0 1584.1 
Dispersion of market share distribution 1.41 1.22 1.32 1.46 1.64 1.74 2.47 2.39 3.24 3.38 
The coefficient of variation (dispersion) 0.13% 0.11% 0.13% 0.14% 0.16% 0.17% 0.27% 0.26% 0.39% 0.40% 
The Gini index 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 
The Hall-Tideman index HT 0.017 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.033 0.034 0.044 0.049 
Absolute entropy E 3.42 3.57 3.52 3.46 3.37 3.30 3.00 2.98 2.83 2.74 
Relative entropy ER 49.9% 51.9% 51.8% 50.9% 50.6% 49.4% 47.1% 46.6% 45.9% 44.6% 
The maximum share index 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
The Linda’s index 19 18 27 27 26 9 11 9 10 7 
The inverse share value index 0.1937 0.0223 0.1302 0.0353 0.1575 0.0316 0.0392 0.0216 0.0120 0.1674 
Source: Calculated by the authors using the data provided by the Central Bank of Russia. 
 
  
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Table B1. The values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of a number of EA/EU countries and Russia  
in the banking sector for the period of 2009–2017 
 
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Estonia 3090 2929 2613 2493 2483 2445 2409 2406 2419 
Greece 1183 1214 1278 1487 2136 2195 2254 2332 2307 
Lithuania 1693 1545 1871 1749 1892 1818 1939 1938 2189 
The Netherlands 2034 2049 2067 2026 2105 2131 2104 2097 2087 
Cyprus 1085 1125 1030 1007 1645 1445 1443 1366 1964 
Finland 3480 3830 3880 3250 3410 3630 3160 2300 1700 
Malta 1250 1181 1203 1313 1458 1648 1620 1602 1599 
Russia* 1337 1182 1186 1311 1309 1390 1462 1434 1533 
Croatia - - - - 1384 1364 1396 1405 1387 
Slovakia 1273 1239 1268 1221 1215 1221 1250 1264 1332 
Latvia 1181 1005 929 1027 1037 1001 1033 1080 1235 
Portugal 1150 1207 1206 1191 1197 1164 1215 1181 1220 
Slovenia 1256 1160 1142 1115 1045 1026 1077 1147 1133 
Denmark 1042 1077 1192 1130 1160 1190 1180 1224 1123 
Belgium 1622 1439 1294 1061 979 981 998 1017 1102 
Czech 1032 1045 1014 999 999 949 987 1009 1028 
Spain 507 528 596 654 719 839 896 937 965 
Sweden 899 860 863 853 876 880 866 845 914 
Romania 857 871 878 852 821 797 860 894 909 
Bulgaria 846 789 766 738 730 836 919 939 906 
Hungary 864 828 848 873 862 792 763 787 802 
Ireland 714 700 645 630 671 673 672 636 658 
Poland 574 559 563 568 586 656 670 659 645 
France 605 610 600 545 568 584 589 572 574 
Italy 298 410 407 410 406 424 435 452 519 
United Kingdom 467 523 519 527 525 462 438 422 453 
Austria 414 383 423 395 405 412 397 358 375 
Luxembourg 310 343 346 345 357 330 321 260 256 
Germany 206 301 317 307 266 300 273 277 250 
Source: Eurostat; calculated by the authors. 
Note. The color scale shows an increase in the index from green (minimum) to red (maximum); for Russia, the HHI is calculated by the 
amount of commercial loans issued by banks. 
 
 
